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A STRUCTURE FOR PROBLEM SOLVING BETWEEN UNION AND MANAGEMENT
Four brief case studies ( a quality-of-work-life committee and
three Scanlon Plan plants) explore the effects on individual partici-
pants and group discussions of mixing or separating the roles of
bargaining and problem solving. A separate group differentiated from
bargaining facilitates problem solving but requires integration with the
union and management organizations.

Organizational psychology has contributed little so far to the
improvement of union-management relationships (or any other interorgani-
zational problem). While the law has formalized the highly effective
institutional systems (Dunlop, 1958) of conflict resolution in the
United States and while skilled industrial-relations practitioners have
improved the functioning of particular collective bargaining relationships
Healy, 1965), the evolving social technology of planned social change
has contributed little to collective bargaining (Beer and Driscoll, 1977).
[For notable but limited exceptions to this generalization see Blake,
Sheppard, and Mouton (1964), Hundert (1974), Rober (1975).] For example,
following Schein's (1969) analysis, an "interorganizational process
consultant" would focus on improving the processes of problem solving,
decision making and communication between the union and management as
organizations. The purpose of this paper is to describe and explore in
four locations an interorganizational structure to facilitate problem
solving between unions and management organizations.
Conceptual Underpinnings
A union and management in a collective bargaining relationship
have both different and common interests. Wages will always be a cost to
management and income to the employees in a union; but increased sales and
consequent employment satisfies both organizations. Walton and McKersie
(1965) describe two different social processes to maximize one organizations
interests depending on whether a topic represents different or common
interests with another organization.
Walton (1976) summarizes these two modes of interpersonal behavior,
called here bargaining and problem solving, in Table 1:

TABLE 1: Bargaining and Problem Solving as Alternative Modes of Behavior
BARGAINING PROBLEM SOLVING
1. Behavior is purposeful in
pursuing own goals.
2. Secrecy
3. Accurate personal understanding
of own needs, but publicly
disguised or misrepresented--
don ' t let them know what you
really want most so that they won't
know how much you are really willing
to give up to get it.
4. Unpredictable, mixed strategies,
utilizing the element of surprise.
Threats and bluffs.
1. Behavior is purposeful in
pursuing goals held in common.
2. Openness
3. Accurate personal understanding
of own needs and accurate and
open representation of them.
Predictable; while flexible
behavior is appropriate, it is
not designed to take other
party by surprise.
Threats or bluffs are not
used.
Search behavior is devoted to
finding ways of appearing to
become committed to a position;
logical, nonrational, and
irrational arguments alike may
serve this purpose.
Success is often enhanced (where
teams, committees, or organizations
are involved on each side) by
forming bad stereotype of the other,
by ignoring the other's logic, by
increasing the level of hostility.
These tend to strengthen in-group
loyalty and convince others that
you mean business.
Pathological extreme is when one
assumes that everything that prevents
other from reaching other's goal also
must facilitate one's own movement
toward his goal; thus, one would state
his own goals as being to negate goal
achievement of the other.
Search behavior is devoted to
finding solutions to problems,
utilizing logical and innovative
processes.
Success demands that stereotypes
be dropped, that ideas be given
consideration on their merit
regardless of sources, and that
hostility not be induced
deliberately. In fact, positive
feelings about others are both
a cause and an effect of other
aspects of problem solving.
Pathological extreme is when one
will assume that whatever is good
for others and group is necessarily
good for self. Cannot distinguish
own identity from group or other
person's identity. Will not take
responsibility for own self.
9. Etc.
Source: Walton (1976)
Etc.

While most union-management relationships in the U.S. emphasize
bargaining, this paper assumes that an effective and efficient relationship
from the perspective of both sides must include both bargaining and problem
solving. Walton and McKersie identify these processes as ideal types
present in any union-management relationship. The present argument is
stronger. A good union-management relationship must include individuals
and groups actively engaged in the behavioral process of problem solving
with the other organization or its own interests suffer on two grounds.
First, the relationship is less effective because it misses the innovative
solutions to common problems more likely to emerge from a problem-solving
process. And second, it is less efficient because bargaining wastes time
in areas of agreement.
While problem solving and bargaining require different behavior
of participants for success (Table 1), such conflicting requirements are
common in organizations. For example, Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) report
that the departments in manufacturing firms have varying degrees of formal
structure to perform the tasks required by their contacts outside the
organization. The members of these departments also hold different
orientations towards time and other people. In that study, successful firms
differentiate to match external demands.
This paper explores the usefulness of differentiating or separating
the processes of bargaining and problem solving in a union-management
relationship. Differentiation here means different people specialize in
problem solving as representatives of the union or employees and of management.
This separation removes the expectations of bargaining behavior built into
representative roles in collective bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965).

These behavioral expectations are probably both external and
internal. They can arise from both union and management constituencies
and from the self images of representatives themselves. Katz and Kahn (1966)
refer to these as respectively intersender and intrareceiver role conflicts.
In a provocative discussion of organizational development in
unionized workforces, Kochan and Dyer (1976) reach the same general
conclusion en the need for differentiation but they do not spell out
its mechanics.
This study will explore three hypotheses formalizing this argument.
1. If people from formal bargaining roles engage in problem
solving, they experience conflicting behavioral
expectations both from their constituents and from their
self images.
2. Some personal strategies to cope with this conflict, such
as withdrawal, reduce the likelihood and the effectiveness
of problem solving.
3. Assigning some people from both union and management to
exclusively problem-solving roles increases the likelihood
and the amount of interorganizational problem solving.
In order to explore these hypotheses, this paper examines four case studies,
one, a joint committee on the quality of work life in a large urban hospital,
and the others, three manufacturing plants using the Scanlon Plan (Lesieur,
1958).
The Quality of Work Life Committee
Methodology
The first study examines the meetings of a union-management committee
charged with establishing an experimental program to improve the qualify of
work life in a large, voluntary hospital located in an urban area in the
northeastern United States. This brief case description is part of a larger

research project and only the Information relevant to these hypotheses is
presented here.
The joint committee includes members of the hospital administration,
an attending physician, and representatives of the three employee associations
covered by collective bargaining agreements at the time of the case: one
association of the residents and interns, another association for nurses,
and a union for other direct care and support workers such as nursing aides,
housekeeping staff, and dietary staff. Each association was affiliated with
larger organizations: city and state associations for the resident staff
and nurses respectively and an international union for the other hospital
workers. Thus, in terms of the hypotheses this committee is not differentiated:
the three employee representatives come from bargaining roles.
The quality of work life program was initiated by the National
Quality of Work Center (NQWC) as an experiment to improve both the satis-
faction derived by workers from their jobs and the performance of the work
organization. This program received funding from the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to support the efforts of an outside consultant towards
these objectives and also to support an independent assessment of the program's
effects. Originally, the Center suggested the program to the international
union representing the direct care and support workers. At the instigation
of that union, the three employee associations met with the hospital's
administration and agreed to participate in this program. A union-management
committee designated by the administration and these three employee
associations held meetings: first, to identify a unit within the hospital
for the experimental program and, then to select a consultant to undertake
the program. Besides representatives of the hospital administration and the

6employee associations, these meetings typically included a representative
from NQWC and a member of the university-affiliated team assessing the
effectiveness of the program.
The data for this study comes from a diary maintained by the
independent program-assessment team. At least one member of this team
describes each meeting of the union-management committee. The content of
this diary varies over time. Some entries describe the frequency and
direction of communication among the members of the committee. All entries
list the meeting's participants, an assessment of its climate, particular
problems discussed by the committee, and specific comments made by committee
members.
This report focuses on the representative of the international
union of hospital workers, a full-time, paid member of the international
union staff supporting the hospital local. The international union is more
typical of collecitve-bargaining agents than the associations representing
the doctors and nurses.
Results
The international staff representative moves through three stages
in his involvement with the Committee during its first 10 months and 19
committee meetings. Initially, he participates actively in Committee dis-
cussions and moves from an orientation of suspicion to trust in the Committee
members. For example, at the outset, he raises concerns about the number
of administration representatives on the Committee because a number of adminis-
trators had shown up unexpectedly at the first meeting of this designated
Committee. After nine meetings, however, he drops this concern and indicates
that unequal represent*) tion is no problem, "I trust everyone."

Indeed, he becomes the focal member of the Committee, ranking first in
frequency of participation in half the meetings. Under the Committee's
rule of rotating responsibility for its direction, he chairs the first
Committee interview with a prospective consultant for the program. After
this high point of involvement, he refers to the Committee as "my baby."
After several meetings and because of the groups slow development
in accomplishing its tasks, the independent assessment team proposes and
finances the use of a process consultant to assist the group (Schein, 1969).
With the assistance of that consultant .the group continues to work on its
assigned tasks.
In a second stage, after about 5 months of meetings, external events
increase pressure on the union representative from his constituency concerning
his participation in the Committee. A new hospital director takes office and
initiates a separate program to increase productivity. At the same time,
the municipal government providing support to the hospital experiences a
financial crisis threatening both the hospital and the union. These develop-
ments make cooperation with management unpopular politically. At this point,
the international representative misses two consecutive Committee meetings.
The comments of other Committee members during those meetings describe
him as personally threatened by his involvement in the Committee with its heavy
management and professional membership and by the possibility of imposed
productivity changes. Both the President and the Vice President of the
local union are described in the meetings as skeptical about parti-
cipation in the Committee. As the representative comments on his return,
after missing these meetings, "I can't hobnob for an hour a week and then
face you as the opposition if necessary."

8In his third stage, the union representative does return to
participate in the Committee's meeting, but over the course of the next two
meetings he specifies his role more carefully. He repeats his willingness
to work with the Committee and offers to clarify with his union the difference
between the quality-of-work program and any unrelated productivity changes.
He stipulates for the first time however, that this committee's proposals are
not final, presumably reserving that decision to the union. Finally, he states
that he would be unable to attend the Committee's meetings in the future; he
would send an assistant in his stead. With the union representatives active
participation, the Committee completes two major tasks during this 10 month
period: selecting a ward for the qaulity-of-work program and retaining a
consultant to initiate the program.
Conclusions
The pattern of this union representative required to engage in
problem solving with the management on issues of potential common interest
supports the three hypotheses. First, he experiences role conflict. His
initial concern over the Committee's composition suggests his own uncertainty
about meeting with management. While continued meetings with the group
modify his personal suspicions, the expectations of his constituents continue
to question his discussions with management. As stated in the second hypothesis,
his efforts to cope with this conflict limit effective problem solving. He
repeatedly threatens to withdraw from the Committee and misses several
meetings. His pattern of conflict and response support the third hypothesis.
As a member of an undifferentiated Committee, he experiences role conflict.
I t is possible a more differentiated Committee would remove this impediment
to problem solving. To explore this possibility, this study describes three
plants where such differentiated committees operate as part of the Scanlon Plan.

Three Plants with the Scanlon Plan
The Scanlon Plan Is a plant-wide system to generate productivity
gains through employee committees and to share these gains with all employees
through a monthly financial bonus (Lesieur, 1958). Although no figures exist,
the Plan is probably at present the most widespread system of union-management
cooperation on production problems in the U.S. Joseph Scanlon developed the
Plan in the late 1930 's while a member of the United Steel Workers, to
facilitate cooperation to improve a plant's competitive position. Today
his protege, Fred Lesieur, a former local union president, serves as a con-
sultant to unions and managements installing the Plan. Recently several
major manufacturing firms have encouraged their local managers to experiment
with the Plan (Recent Initiatives, 1976). The then National Commission (now
Center) on Productivity and Work Quality has recently published a summary of
the empirical studies on the Plan showing positive results in about two-thirds
of the reported cases (1975). The focus of concern here is the elaborate
system of employee committees set up under the Plan.
The Scanlon Plan as described by Lesieur (1958) includes two types
of committees set up independent from the union-management bargaining process.
The Production Committees in each organizational unit (e.g. department) include
employee representatives elected by the non-supervisory members of that unit.
By tradition and at the urging of Lesieur, union leaders (e.g. stewards,
safety committee members) do not serve on these Committees. While the unit
supervisor heads this Committee's regular informal discussions and chairs its
one formal meeting each month, the Committee can bypass the supervisor and
refer an employee suggestion to a plant-wide joint Screening Committee. Thus
these Production Committee representatives are charged specifically with
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increasing productivity, although employee suggestions inevitably deal with
personal comfort and maintenance as well.
The Screening Committee coordinates the Plan's activities in the
plant and resolves disagreements or major plant decisions originating in
the Production Committees. Thus, it too is separate from the bargaining
process. The Plant Manager chairs this Committee and retains final decision
on production issues. The plant staff managers also sit on the Committee.
Employees are represented by elected members of the Production Committees
and by the head of the local union. The union head monitors both the
Plan's operation and the Screening Committee's discussion to insure that
issues covered by the labor agreement are not dealt with by the Committee.
Methodology
In order to explore the usefulness of these differentiated
structured described by the Plan's proponents, this study describes one-
day visits to three plants using the Plan accompanied by an outside con-
sultant on the Plan. The three are all manufacturing plants varying in
size (1000, 500, and 100 employees). Each is represented by a different
union ( two major internationals and a local independent). The visits
include the monthly Screening Committee meeting in each plant and semi-
structured interviews with the plant management including the personnel-
industrial relations manager, local union heads, union stewards and Pro-
duction Commitee representatives. Questions in the interviews deal with
the relationship between the union and the Plan and the Plan's committee
system.
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Results
Do specialized structures differentiated from bargaining
between union and management facilitate problem solving between these
organizations? First, differentiation of people does exist. Sleeted
employees on the Production Committees are not the union stewards for
that unit. This separation varies across the three plants. The largest
plant had littlte overlap, "while the two smaller plants have several
Committees where stewards or union safety-committe members also serve on
Production Committees. Strauss and Sayles (1957) also note the few natural
leaders to staff both the union and the Plan in small plants. The Screening
Committees in all Plan plants are not purely differentiated structures by
membership although they are devoted to problem solving on areas of com-
mon interest. Both the union president and the personnel-industrial re-
lations managers are members.
These two people, however especially the union head , fill special
roles. They monitor the discussion from the perspective of the bargaining
process. In two of the Screening Committee meetings, these monitoring
roles actually ruled certain issues out of the discussion. In! addition,
the outside consultant states and encourages that exclusion of bargaining
issues in the Plan's introduction and in the visits described here. In
one plant, the union president is going to review the Production Committees'
minutes before they are distributed to the Screening Committee.
The Production Committee participants interviewed report that
they engage in problem solving rather than bargaining, seeking solutions
to production problems rather than using threats to demand changes in
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working conditions. Inevitably in a hui(i*n rather than a mechanical process,
safety and contract issues are raised on occasion in Production Committees.
Such complaints are usually referred to the appropriate union representative
although the lines between these areas are not completely clear.
The three Screening Committee meetings observed compare favorably with
normative criteria for problem solving(Schein, 1969). Many members par-
ticipate in the discussion, both managers and elected employee representa-
tives. Participation reflects information on problems rather than organi-
zational position. For example
}
skilled craftspeople from other depart-
ments discuss each department's suggestions along with the appropriate
staff managers. And finally, these elected representatives confront the
plant managers and their staffs on past suggestions which are not yet im-
plemented.
The three Committees observed vary in their approaches to problem
solving. Some plant managers intiate a larger proportion of remarks in
the meetings and decide issues either unilaterally or before complete
discussion. Nonetheless, the open problem-solving process described above
functions to some extent in eachof these meetings between management and
union members.
Conclusions
The separation of problem=solving from bargaining under the Scanlon
Plan in these three cases facilitates the former process. First, roles
are clearly defined. Employee representatives in the Production Committees
focus on productivity. A strong and frequently verbalized norm precludes
labor-contract issues and eliminates most of these issues. In the Screening
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Committee, the Production Committee representatives focus on problem sol-
ving while the union headsafeguards employee interests when the discussion
spills over onto bargaining issues. Since fihere are no clear lines around
bargaining issues, the union head protects employee interests rather than
simply serving as a parliamentarian. Discussion of bargaining issues can
be curtailed immediately by invoking the Scanlon Plan norm if the union
head feels the discussion jeopardizes the interests of bargaining-unit
employees. Two of the three meetings dealt with bargaining issues^ work
rules and assignment of overtime) in passing and without the interruption
of the union heads.
Second, these cases show a variety of responses to such conflict of
roles as exists. In one Screening Committee, the union head took almost
no part in the discussion. This withdrawal probably resulted from an
extremely salient conflict. in personal role expectations. He was meeting
with the management on the same afternoon to negotiate a new local contract.
In the Production Committees where stewards also serve, two such people
describe their roles as similar in all discussions with management including
the Plan. They"stick up"for their less vocal and aggressive peers, The
Production Committee for them is one of many avenues to get management
action. While this personal redefinition allows them to fill two potentially
conflicting roles, these dual representatives may well shy away from con-
sidering productivity-related suggestions with any potential for employee
resistance. As hypothesized ( 1 and 2), these respones impede problem solving.
In each, of these plants, the employees are aggressively pursuing
through the ScanlonyPlan Committees productivity increases unlikely in
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many union-management relationships. In all the plants, some union mem-
bers feel their fellow employees go too far: they see a speed up and fear
future layoffs. These internal challenges pose a real and continuing
threat to the Plan, but so far the three union leaderships manage the
changes proposed under the Plan to the satisfaction of the major interest
groups in the membership, Interestingly, these three union heads support
the Plan although two have replaced the union heads who helped introduce
the Plan.
And finally, as evidenced by the consideration of a range of pro-
duction problems by elected representatives from the bargaining unit
in these three plants, the differentiated structures of the Plan (Production
and Screening Committees) facilitate problem solving in the midst of a bar-
gaining relationship. Hypothesis 3 is thus supported.
Discussion
These four cases suggest that organizational design can improve the
interorganizational process of problem solving. A committee or working
group composed of employee and management representatives under the Scanlon
Plan engage quite easily in problem solving in the midst of a bargaining
relationship, partially at least because they are not the same people who
engage in bargaining. The quality-of-work-life committee case demonstrates
that problem solving and bargaining require different behavior from their
participants (Walton and McKersie, 1965). At least some of the responses
to this conflict in roles (the international representative's withdrawal)
as well as customary bargaining-role behavior (his threats of withdrawal)
interfere with effective problem solving. Thus a process consultant
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might suggest a special committee with representatives elected by the
employees to deal specifically with a problem where the management and
the union have common interests. The quality of work life is such an
area, but the hospital case described here demonstrates the difficult
demands placed on a union leader asked to participate in such a process.
While Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) identify this need to differentiate
groups to deal with such different organizational tasks, they also em-
phasize the need for the organization to coordinate the different groups.
(Lawrence and Lorsch call this integration.) Any group set up especially
for problem solving must be coordinated with the respective union and
managment organizations. Union officials feel this need acutely in their
political organizations where another set of elected officials poses a
threat to their positions. Supervisors, however, also need to know the
limits of any joint union-management committee.
The Scanlon Plan represents one approach to integrating a differentiated
problem-solving group into the ongoing activities of the union and manage-
ment.. The Production Committees are subordinate to the existing union and
management organization. These Committees cannot deal with contractual
matters. Besides this rule , a hierarchy of authority subordinates the Pro-
duction Committee to the Screening Committee where the local union head
and the plant managern make final decisions.
Students of organizational design identify many ways to coordinate
differentiated or specialized activities (Galbraith , 1973). Rules and a
hierarchy of authority are two of the simplest. A matrix organization re-
presents a more elaborate form of integration. For example, if an organi-
zation devotes substantial attention to various goals in employee relations,
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elected representative might serve a variety of functions including pro-
ductivity (as in the Scanlon Plan) , equal employment opportunity and
safety and health. If these representatives exercise substantial authority,
then a first-line supervisor might only coordinate these representatives
for a given department, sharing control over them with staff managers
This organizational design
responsible for functional committees in the plant ( is described in Figure 1).
These four existing cases demonstrate the potential for a process
consultant to improve the relationship between a union and management by
designing an appropriate organizational structure to support problem solving.
Experience under the Scanlon Plan in unionized firms provides additional
guidelines for problem solving on production matters whether the label be
organizational development, job redesign or the quality of work life.
Besides establishing the differentiated and integrated structure of commit-
tees for problem solving described above, the Scanlon Plan also uses an out-
side consultant who is neutral between the union and management- The value
of such a third-party consultant recurs in studies of organizational change
(Grenier, 1967). The Plan also shares the gains from productivity through
a monthly bonus. Although equity suggests such gain sharing, other or-
ganizational change projects often stop short of this commitment (Dyer, 1976).
The interorganizational processes between a union and management include
both problem solving and bargaining and, as Kochan and Dyer (1976) point out,
bargaining goals must always take precedence for a labor union. Nonetheless,
the bargaining process itself can also be systematically changed. Healy
(1965) describes a phased strategy to change a collective bargaining rela-
tionship:

>11

17
1. improve the existing relationship (focusing primarily on the perform-
ance of the grievance procedure as a problem to both parties);
2. create ad-hoc study groups to gather information and identify points
of agreement on particular problems;
3. create continuing study groups for the same purpose to deal with new
problems as they arise;
4. initiate continuous negotiations by allowing the modification of the
contract as new problems or points of agreements are identified by study groups.
Thus the two parties may change a collective bargaining relationship either
to include problem solving on production problems as in the four cases
reported here or on bargaining issues as Healy (1965) describes.. On bar-
gaining issues, problem solving may remove barriers from the grievance
procedure, focus areas of disagreement or identify common problems.
A bargaining process with some problem solving or at least the recog-
nition of a common problem may well be a prerequisiste for problem
solving on production matters (Kochan and Dyer, 1976). In a conflict-
ridden relationship, even the neatly differentiated problem-solving struc-
v
ture described here may only serve as another site for bargaining tactics.
Conversely as described by Healy (1965), an undifferentiated group
of bargaining negotiators from both sides may engage in problem solving
without the facilitation of the differentiated structure described here.
In such settings however, Healy describes a number of ground rules often
adopted to facilitate problem solving, e.g. no positions are binding,
ideas are freely exchanged, and no publicity is allowed. These ground rules
conform to normative guidelines for problem solving (Schein, 1969).
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The four cases in this study suggest the usefulness of a separate
group of employee representatives to focus on problem solving within a
union-management relationship. These exploratory findings support
Lawrence and Lorsch's (1969) emphasis on the need for differentiation in
organizations facing multiple tasks in their environement. Just as
Lawrence and Lorsch find within management, coordinating or integrating
these differentiated groups poses difficult but soluable probles for the
union and management. This study identifies organizational design as a
tool for process consultation in union-management relationships. The
potential for applying this and other insights from the applied behavioral
sciences to this key set of organizations remains largely untapped.

19
REFERENCES
1. Beer, Michael and James W. Driscoll, "Strategies for Change." In J.
Richard Hackman and J. Lloyd Suttle, Improving Life at Work: Behavioral
Science Approaches to Organizational Change . Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear,
1977.
2. Blake, Robert R. , Herbert A. Shepard, and Jane S. Mouton, Managing Inter-
group Conflict in Industry . Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Company, 1964.
3. Dyer, Lee, "New Work Theories and Compensation Problems," Monthly Labor
Review , 1976 (March) 99(3)41-42.
4. Dunlop, John, "Industrial Relations System," Industrial Relations System .
NY: Holt, 1958, pp. 1-32.
5. The First Eighteen Months: A Report . National Quality of Work Center
and the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan.
6. Frost, Carl F. , John H. Wakely, Robert A. Ruh, The Scanlon Plan for
Organizational Development, Identity, Participation, and Equity .
East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1974.
7. Ga]braith, Jay, Designing Complex Organizations , Reading Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1973.
8. Healy, James J., Creative Collective Bargaining: Meeting Today's
Challenge to Labor-Management Relations . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1965.
9. Hundert, Alan T. , "Application of the Organization Development Process to
Intergroup Conflict: A Case With Union and Management," paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans,
LA, August 30, 1974.
10. Katz, Daniel and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations .
NY: Wiley, 1966.
11. Kochan, Thomas A. and Lee Dyer, "A Model of Organizational Change in the
Context of Union-Management Relations," Journal of Applied Behavioral
Science
, 1976, 12(1)59-78.
12. Lawrence, Paul R. and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment :
Managing Differentiation and Integration . Homewood , IL: Irwin, 1969.
13. Lesieur, Fred G. , The Scanlon Plan: A Frontier in Labor-Management
Cooperation . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1958.
14. A Plant-Wide Productivity Plan in Action: Three Years of Experience
With the Scanlon Plan . Washington, DC: National Commission on
Productivity and Work Quality (undated).

20
15. Recent Initiatives in Labor-Management Cooperation . National Center
for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, Washington, DC 20036,
February 1976.
16. Roeber, Joe, Social Change at Work: The ICI Weekly Staff Agreement .
London: Duckworth, 1975.
17. Schein, Edgar H. , Process Consultation: Its Role in Organizational
Development . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley , 1969.
18. Strauss, George and Leonard R. Sayles, "The Scanlon Plan: Some
Organizational Problems," Human Organization
, 1957, 16(Fall) 15-22.
19. Walton, Richard E. , "How to Choose Between Strategies of Conflict and
Cooperation," in Larry Porter and Cyril R. Mill (eds.), Reading Book
for Human Relations Training . Arlington, VA : National Institutes for
Applied Behavioral Science, 1976.
20. Walton, Richard E. and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor
Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System . NY: McGraw-
Hill, 1965.


Date
m*SEMENT
SEP 2 6 m
MR 2 5 '88
H028.M4H no.925- 77
Barocci. Thoma/Public v
'31524 • ' ,
,
."'W
worjis protects
3 lOflO 000 flbb fi5E
HD28.M414 no 926- 77
Dnscoll. Jame/A structure for problen
731526...
.
D«BKS 0003/721
3 1080 000 fibb fl?fl
H028.M414 no.927- 77
He Backer. Car/A heuristic approach to
73,52
.P- °*^§i OOO57722
3 1080 QOO fibb AIM
HD28.M414 no.928- 77
Harris, Reuben/Organization problem-ha
731530 D*BKS,... PQP37723,I0 0«Bk
III III
3 1080 003 010 flflfl
HD28.M414 no.929- 77
Kolb Deborah /The mediator s taxonomy
731532 0»BK§ P..Q.QJJ7.7.?.4.,,
lOflO 000 flbb 110
HD28.M414 no.930- 77
Bailyn, Lotte. /Technical careers at mi
731534 D»BKS 11 0PP3772
r
"HI!!"
'
loao 000 abb i3b
HD28.M414 no.931- 77
Little. John D/A theory for pricing no
731536... D.*BKS
.
.
00037726.
3 lOflO 000 flbb 151
H028.M414 no.932- 77
Katz, Ralph. /Satisfaction and behavi
731538 0*BKS 00037727
3 lOflO 000 flbb 77

